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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NEIL TROTTA,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 18237

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Defendant/Respondent.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated
1953, from a decision by the Board of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah,
reversing a decision by an Appeals Referee that allowed unemployment compensation to the Plaintiff/Appellant pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979), on the grounds he had
been discharged from his last employment for actions connected with his work
which were not

disq~alifying.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff Neil Trotta's October 30, 1981 claim for unemployment benefits was allowed effective November 1, 1981, by a Department Representative
who found he was discharged for an act or omission in connection with his
employment.which was not disqualifying pursuant to Section 35-4-S(b)(l), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979).

Timely appeal was

made by the employer to the Appeals Referee of the Department of Employment
Security on November 17, 1981.

On December 10,

19~1,

a hearing was conducted

and subsequently, the Referee affirmed the allowance of benefits by the Department Representative.

On December 16, 1981, timely appeal was made by the

employer to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which
in turn reversed the decision of the Referee allowing benefits to the Plaintiff in a decision dated February 4, 1982, Case No. 81-A-4474 and 81-BR-431.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff by this appeal is seeking reversal of the decision of
the Board of Review and allowance of benefits commencing November 1, 1981.
Defendant seeks affinnance of the decision of the Board of Review which
denied benefits to the Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant substantially agrees with the statement of facts set forth in
Plaintiff's Brief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM
THE FINDING OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well estab1i shed.

Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part:
In any judicial proceedings under this section the findings of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the
facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and
the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to questions of 1aw.

This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be
disturbed.

Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970).

In analyzing the above-referenced review provision, this Court has stated:
Under Section 35-4-lO(i) the role of this Court is to
sustain the determination of the Board of Review unless
the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of
the Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the determination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion
could be drawn from the facts. Continental Oil Company
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah,
(Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff contends the facts as found by the Board of Review are not
supported by the evidence.

This Court has previously held that where the

3
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evidence will sustain different findings, the Court will affinn the findings
of the Board of Review.
Ther~

Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review, Supra.

is substantial evidence in the record of this case to sustain the

decision of the Board of Review.

Defendant acknowledges this is a very close

case as reflected by the 2-1 Board decision to reverse the Appeal Referee's
allowance of benefits.

Nevertheless, the case is close because much of the

employer's evidence· is hearsay, which, unfortunately is quite o.ften the case
in the commission's administrative hearings where the employer has little or
no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome; is usually represented by lay
persons unfamiliar with rules of evidence who have interviewed the parties
having direct knowledge of the matters, but who themselves have no such
direct knowledge.
The easy answer in such cases would be to exclude the employer's hearsay
evidence.

This, however, would be an abdication of Defendant's responsibil-

ity to administer the unemployment insurance trust funds to pay benefits to
all who are unemployed through no fault of their own, but to deny benefits
to those who are responsi b1e for their own unemployment..

01 of Nelson Con-

struction Company' v. Industrial Commission, 121 .U. 525, 243 P. 2d 951; Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U.

2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987.
Furthermore, hearsay evidence is admissable in administrative hearings
but must be carefully evaluated to determine its probative value.

Board of

Review v. Theresa J. Cija, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 1981, CCH Unemployment
Insurance Reports, Pa. •10,723.

4
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In analyzing the evidence given regarding Plaintiff's absences on October 19, 20, 27 and 28, 1981, it is noted that the only questions that are not
conclusively answered are:

1)

whether Plaintiff went deer hunting on more

than one of the four days he was absent from work; 2)

whether Plaintiff or

his wife actually called the employer to report he would not be in; and 3)
if they did call in, whether they merely said he wouldn't be in or whether
they reported he was ill.
There is no question that:
1.

Plaintiff went deer hunting on at least one regular
work day; (R.0026-0028).

2.

Plaintiff failed to request any of the days off from
his employer in that according to his own testimony
he or his wife merely called the shop and told whomever answered (they couldn't identify with whom they
spoke) that Plaintiff would not be in.

(R.0025,

0030-0031)
3.

Plaintiff made no effort to inform the employer of
the reason he wouldn't be to work.

(R.0023-0025,

0027, 0030-0031)
4.

Plaintiff knew he was needed at work.

(R.0029, 0031)

5.

The employer has substantial reason to believe Plaintiff was absent because he was deer hunting on at
least one day when he should have been to work or at
least have requested the day off.

(R.0023, 0032)

5
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6.

The employer terminated Plaintiff not only because
he believed Plaintiff was deliberately avoiding his
responsibilities to the employer to either be to
work or request the days off, but because he felt
Defendant was not being trustworthy regarding his
absences.

{R.0023-25, 0031, 0032)

Under Part A of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues that going deer
hunting while sick with the flu is not misconduct.

Such a generalized state-

ment is incorrect on its face; however, neither the employer's decision to
discharge the Plaintiff, nor the Board's denial of benefits were based on
this premise.

As stated below, the reason claimant was terminated by the

employer and denied unemployment benefits by the Board of Review is that he
failed to notify the employer of the reasons for his absence and attempted to
conceal those reasons from his employer.

He thus lost his credibility with

his employer (R.0032) and failed to establish credibility with the Board of
Review (R.0007 and 0008) or even the Appeal Referee, who had allowed benefits
{R.0018).
Under Part B of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues he did not break
any company policies regarding absences from work.

Pl ai nti ff cites as sup-

port for this argument a sentence from the testimony of t.he employer's representative, Mrs. Fisher, at R.0023, that any employee could have time off for
any reason even if it was inconvenient for the employer.
to take notice, however, of Mrs.
employer's policy

Plaintiff failed

Fisher's next sentence which gives the

regarding absenteeism.

Both

sentences are as

I'd like to also state with this information that we like
to feel that we are reasonable with our employees and

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

follows:

anyone who comes to us asking for additional time off
for almost any reason, generally gets it even if it's'inconvenient to us. But we feel that our employees need to
be honest with us and considerate of our needs as employers also, and people who don't tell us what they really
need, we don't feel like we can trust them. (R.0023)
(Emphasis added.)
Mrs. Fisher explained the application of this policy to Plaintiff at
R.0032:
But when the deer hunting problem came up and he couldn't
even call us up to say, "Look, I want to go deer hunting
another day. I won't be in, 11 we felt 1i ke at that point
he didn't trust us enough and we couldn't trust him
enough to keep him around. The date of deer hunting,
even if it was, as he said, the 27th, it would be the
same position. The 27th was a day he should have been at
work. ( R.0032)
Thus it is clear that Plaintiff was not fired for going deer hunting
while ill, or not failing to work overtime, or for poor job perfonnance, or
for fai 1i ng to notify his employer of his absences, al though these factors
may have been part of the overall consideration.

Therefore, Plaintiff's

argument under Parts A, C, D and E beg the question in that they are not
responsive to the primary reason given by the employer for tenni nati ng
Plaintiff

(R .0023,

0032) nor to the reasoning of Defendant in denying Plain-

ti ff unemployment insurance benefits.

(R.0007)

Under Part E of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff
or his wife called the employer each day Plaintiff was absent.

However, even

Plaintiff noted that the requirement was not just that the employee call in,
but that he was to

11

advise them of the reason for the absence ( R.24)

11

13 of Plaintiff's Brief.)

7
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(Page

Even if Plaintiff or his wife did call the employer each day Pl ai nti ff
was absent, it is c1ear that neither advised the emp 1oye r of the reason for

the absence.

(R.0023-0025, 0027, 0030-0031)

Plaintiff was also evasive when answering the Appeal Referee's questions
about explaining the reason for his absence as shown by the following dia1ague:
Referee:

What was your intention as far as calling in
that day or having your wife call in that day,
Mr. Trotta?

Neil
Trotta:

What do you mean my intention?

Referee:

Well, were you accustomed to giving the employer prior notice when you were going to go hunting or take time off work?

Neil
Trotta:

Yeh, I didn't have--see, like, uh, you know, I
took the one day off and they knew about it~
Fri day, the 16th. But as far as I never, you
know, received any type of written regulations,
·employee or whatever, but if you go to the
appeal again, I didn't know where it says-that he, he never called in sick, which was
untrue there, because I did call in on October 19. I definitely called. Let's see •. That
says: " ••• in spite of company pol icy of
which all our employees are aware that all
absences must be excused ahead of time ••• "
Now, when I was sick, I don't see how I could
have known I was going to be sick in advance.
I tell you, that sounds a little bit ridicu1ous. ( R.0027)

Defendant submits that Plaintiff's response to the Appeal Referee's
question is indicative of a guilty conscience.

Plaintiff knew he had misled

his employer about his absence; that he had not been forthright as was
Mr. Gardner who called the employer to ask for the day off to go deer hunting

8
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with Plaintiff.

(R.0023)

In this regard it is noted that Mr. Gardner rec-

ognized his obligation to request time off from the employer, even though
he was a part-time employee who came in a few hours after high school twice
a week.

(R.0028 &0032)

Obviously Plaintiff also recognized that obligation

and deliberately violated it.
It should al so be noted that the Appeal Referee pointed out "several
inconsistencies in infonnation presented by the claimant" (R.0018), and the
Board of Review found his statement of reason for quit or discharge (R.0039)
to be mi sl eadi ng and his testimony that he was i 11 on October 27 to 1ack
credibility (R.0007-0008).
An example of Pl ai nti ff' s inconsistency is found in his response to his
employer's appeal to the Board of Review, where he states:
He contends I went deer hunting on Oct. 19, 20, 27, and
the 28. Why would I have done that when I got a deer on
opening day Oct. 17th and on the 19th and 20th 1 was
sick. He also states I went hunting on Oct. 28th which
would be extremely illegal for the season closed on
Oct. 27th, that is the day I went with Jack Gardner who,
for a reason unknown to me signed a statement saying he
went hunting with me on Oct. 20. That could be easily
proven by a simple attendance check on Jack Gardner who
attends Cypress High School. I'm sure you wil 1 find
he was in attendance on Oct. 20th and was absent on
Oct. 27th. Jack is a senior at Cypress High School.
(R.0011) (Emphasis added.)
In this one paragraph Plaintiff argues he would not have gone deer hunt; ng on October 19, 20, 27 and 28 because he got his deer on opening day,
October 17, and that hunting on October 28 would have been i 11 egal because
the season closed October 27.
ber 27.

He then admits he did go deer hunting on Octo-

If he got his deer on October 17, why did he fee 1 he needed to go

hunting on October 27?

It is inconsistent to argue he wouldn't have gone

hunting on October 20 because he got his deer on October 17 and then admit
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

·he went hunting on October 27.

This further

demons~rates

his disregard for

his employer's interest when he chooses to go deer hunting after he got his
deer rather than report to work.

The Pl ai nti ff 1 s testimony as to the dates

he actually went hunting is contradicted by the employer's testimony that a
co-worker called the night before and asked for October 20 off to go deer
hunting with Plaintiff.

(R.0023, 0037)

In this case it is cl ear from the record that the empl ayer had a small,
informal business in which the rules regarding absenteeism were very liberal.
The only rule was that the employee notify the employer as soon as possible
that he was to be absent and give the reasons for the absence.
Plaintiff deliberately vi al ated this rule in that he or his wife merely
called in to say· Plaintiff would be absent that day without stating the
reason.

No effort was made to talk to the employer or Plaintiff's supervisor

to make sure the proper persons were aware that he would be absent.

Although

there may appear to be some dispute as to dates and whether Plaintiff or his
wife even called in, and what they said if they did ca 11 in, a more candid
employee specifically requested time off to gG deer hunting with Plaintiff,
while Plaintiff clearly withheld the reasons for his absence from his employer, as already noted.
POINT Ill

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED FOR DELIBERATE, WILLFUL ACTION ADVERSE TO
HIS EMPLOYER'S RIGHTFUL INTERESTS.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases throughout his Brief suggesting that
the decision of the Board of Review ; s wrong as a matter of law.

10
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To the

extent Pl ai nti ff has attempted to rel ate those cases to the facts of the
instant matter, the cases are clearly distinguishable.

Defendant acknowl-

edges that a spontaneous decision not intended to injure the employer's
interests is not misconduct, Eagan v. Philips, 431 N.Y.S. 2d 731, 784

o.

2d 564 (App. Div. 1980); nor is a single act of carelessness misconduct,
or mi nor i ndi screti ons for which the employer has no stated policy, as in
Coulter v.

Commonwealth Unemployment Board of Review, 332 A.

2d 876 (Pa.

1975); nor is failure to call a specific office as required by notice when
calls to other areas had been accepted previously by the employer, as in
Penn Photomats Incorporated v.
417 A. 2d 1311 (Pa. 1980).

Commonwealth Compensation Board of Review,

However, the claimant in the instant case was

not di squa 1ifi ed for any of the foregoing reasons, as has been deta i 1ed in
Point

11

hereof.

In the case of Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Supra at 730, this Court has defined misconduct
as:
• • • the intended meaning of the term "misconduct"
••• is limited to conduct evincing such willful or
wanton disregard of employer's interests as is found
in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of
his employee or in carelessness or negligence of such
degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability,
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's
interest or of the employee's duties and obligations
to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency,
unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as
a result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or
ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith
errors in judgment or discretion are not to be ~eemed
"misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.
11
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See also Januzik v. Department of Employment Security and Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission Utah, 569 P. 2d 1112 (Utah 1977).
The facts as found by the Board of Review cl early require the conclusion that the claimant's conduct constituted a "deliberate disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee."
Pl ai nti ff further contends that the employer had a burden to reprimand
or warn the Plaintiff about his conduct.

While warnings put an employee on

notice that his job is in jeopardy, thus supporting a finding of fault on the
part of an employee who continues in conduct of which he has been so warned,
the essential element in misconduct as well as voluntary leaving cases is
whether the claimant is at fault in his resulting unemployment.
Construction Company v.

Industrial Commission,

581 P. 2d 1334 (Utah 1978).

Supra;

Mills

Olof Nelson
v.

Gronning,

In the instant matter, the Board of Review

found the Plaintiff knew that taking the day off to go deer hunting would
cause his employer additional expense and that the Plaintiff further attempted to conceal from his employer the real reason for his absence.
circumstances a denial of benefits is proper.
Compensation, Section 58, Page 954.
being supported by substantial

Under such

76 Am. Jur. 2d, .Unemployment

The findings in the instant matter

competent evidence, the majority decision

of the Board of Review properly concluded that the Pl ai nti ff recognized his
actions would be adverse to the rightful interests of the employer.

Under

such circumstances the decision of the Board of Review denying benefits to
the Plaintiff was correct as a matter of law.

12
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in support of the decision of the Board of Review is both
competent and substantial.

The Board of Review is not bound by the findings

of the Appeal Referee even when such findings are supported by evidence.

The

decision should, therefore, be affinned.
Respectfully submitted this

- - day

of June, 1982.

DAVID L. WILKINSON,
Attorney General of Utah
FLOYD G. AST! N
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

By

----k~.---A~ll~a-n--za~b-e~l~~~~--~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that I mai 1ed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's Brief, postage prepaid, to the following this _ _ day of June, 1982:
John L. Black, Jr., Utah Legal Services, Inc., 637 East Fourth South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
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